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I. Introduction
Since the early part of the 20th century, research in animal genetics and breeding has
focused on commercial applications for livestock production. Since the 194Os, new
breeding technologies have contributed to significant increases in farm-level
productivity. However, the degree to which commercial producers have adopted the
new technologies varies widely across the sectors. Poultry has experienced almost one
hundred percent adoption, while only a small percent of beef producers use improved
breeding technologies. The pork and dairy industries fall somewhere in between.
The livestock industry is currently experiencing significant structural changes, many of
which appear to be linked to technological change. Many studies have attempted to
explain these changes within the context of a specific sector. Few attempts have been
made to draw conclusions across the different sectors on how the diffusion of technology
IS related to industry structure. Thus paper examines the diffusion of the breeding
technologies within the four main livestock sectors in the U.S. and attempts to identify
factors that affect the differing patterns and levels of diffusion. Based on these
conclusions, the paper offers some observations on the relationship between technical
change and industry structure in livestock.
**The author has benefitted from the guidance of Vernon Ruttan, and from the helpful
comments of William Lazarus, Jerome Hammond and Gerald Shut-son.2
The diffusion and impact of breeding technologies is of particular interest because the
area of breeding and genetics research is expected to be an important source of
innovation in the coming decades. At the same time, the potential application of
biotechnology and genetic engineering to commercial livestock production raises many
economic and ethical questions. By reviewing past experience with new breeding
technologies, this paper reveals that many of today’s concerns are not new.
Understanding how they were resolved in the past has important lessons for addressing
similar issues in the context of today’s livestock industry.
II. Review of Diffusion Research
Diffusion is defined as “the process by which an innovation is communicated through
certain channels over time among members of a social system” (Rogers, p. 5). Unlike
adoption theory, which focuses on the decisions of individual users, diffusion theory
deals vvith the spread of an idea, product or innovation at the aggregate level. According
to Thirtle and Ruttan, diffusion doesn’t include the innovation process itself. Rather it
begins with the existence of a new technology and focuses on its pattern and rate of
spread throughout a target population.
Rogers, in his classic book on diffusion of innovations, reviews hundreds of diffusion
studies and identifies variables that may influence diffusion (p. 207). These can be
grouped into three main categories. The first is communication variables, those that
affect how agents become aware of innovations. These include the source of the
innovation, the channels through which agents are exposed to it, and the people or
organizations that promote its adoption.The second category includes characteristics of
the innovation--relative profitability, compatibility with the existing system, complexity,
lumpiness, and ability to be tested and evaluated. Variables in the third category
describe the nature of the production system, such as size, number and type of firms.3
Diffusion of technology is an important area of research in social sciences.In
economics, a classic diffusion study is by Griliches, who characterized diffusion of
hybrid corn through the three parameters of a logistic function, the initial level of use,
the rate of increase of use, and the final ceiling or saturation level. He then attempted to
explain these parameters in terms of economic variables. Griliches’ work, and the studies
that followed, helped clarify the economic forces that drive the diffusion of new
technologies. While agriculture has been the focus of many diffusion studies, animal
agriculture has been neglected relative to crop agriculture.
Diffusion studies have provided insights into the process of technological change,
however shortcomings of the traditional diffusion model limit its usefulness in many
situations. Traditional diffusion studies have tended to focus on the spread of one
particular innovation. However an innovation is often embodied in an input that has a
complementary relationship to other inputs. In such as case, it is difficult to describe the
diffusion process of one input. Technical complementarity is a stronger concept than
“compatibility,”which traditional diffusion studies consider. This issue was raised by
researchers  studying the diffusion of “green revolution” technologies, which consisted of
a package of fertilizers, high-yielding varieties and farming practices (Feder et al).
Further. diffusion studies often focus on competitive environments, where there are a
large number of potential adopters making independent decisions. In many cases this
accurately characterizes the market of interest, however some markets depart from this
assumption in ways that may significantly affect diffusion of innovations. Of particular
interest in this paper is the relationship between vertical and horizontal integration and
technology diffusion. Economic theory suggests that with perfect and complete markets,
demand for inputs, including technology, should be identical under decentralized or4
centralized market structures. If imperfect information, externalities or other market
failures exist, then technology diffusion would be expected to be different in segmented
versus integrated markets.
Finally, traditional diffusion models are static. The underlying assumption is that the
innovation represents the only change in an otherwise stable system. Diffusion
represents the process by which the innovation is incorporated into another stable
equilibrium. In reality, there are often many post-innovation changes with either causal
or coincidental relationships to the innovation under study. A new technology may
substantially change the structure of an industry. This suggests the need for a dynamic
model to take into account the interrelationships between technology, agent behavior and
the economic environment (Ruttan).
The next section describes the diffusion of major breeding technologies in each of the
four main livestock sectors as well as the structural changes that have occurred. In order
to compare diffusion across sectors and across time, the approach taken here is quite
broad, focusing on qualitative descriptions of the diffusion process supported by national
and regional level statistics.However, as section IV will show, several interesting
observations emerge from a comparison of the different industries even at a general
Ievel.
II Diffusion of Breeding Technologies in the Livestock Sector
A. Poultry
During the first half of the 20th century, poultry production developed from a household
activity into a highly mechanized and concentrated industry. Poultry breeding
transformed itself from an art form into an applied science capable of responding to the
demands of commercial production and the marketplace. Today, poultry breeding is5
carried out on an international level by a handful of companies that produce hybrid
chicks, animals which are the product of intensive genetic selection and testing geared to
meet the exacting demands of the processors and consumers. These chicks, whose
pedigrees are protected by patents and trade secrets, are sold, often under contract, to the
large integrators that constitute the poultry production and processing sector. The
technology of hybrid chicks dominates commercial production. All major producers use
it.
The emergence of the modern poultry, and particularly the modern broiler, industry was
linked to an enormous growth in productivity. Poultry research between 1915 and 1960
had an estimated annual rate of return of between 20 and 30 percent (Peterson) In 1934,
broiler production in the U.S. was 34 million birds annually. In 1987,  5 billion broilers
were produced. In 1920, average feed conversion was 13 pounds of feed to one pound of
broiler. By 1940, the ratio had dropped to 4 to 1, and by 1990 it was 1.9 to 1 (Bishop
and Christensen; Bugos). The grow out period was also halved between 1940 and
1987, from 14 weeks to under 7 weeks. Improvements in egg production rose similarly.
In 1930 hens averaged 93 eggs per year; in 1983 the average was 246 (Bishop and
Christensen). Improvements in breeding technologies were an important part of these
increases.
Before 1920, commercial poultry producers produced eggs, with meat as a byproduct.
Private breeders and those at university experiment stations maintained purebred flocks
which were available to farmers interested in improved breeding. During the 1920s
university researchers became active in studying the possibility of hybrid vigor among
crossbred chicks1 (Hanke).In spite of its economic potential, crossbreeding was
1The term hybrid and crossbreed are often used  interchangably  in the literature A crossbreed refers to the
offspring of purebred parents of different breeds. A hybrid refers to the offspring of parents of a different
genotypes. This would include crossbreeds, but would also include offspring of unrelated parents of the6
opposed by the traditional poultry breeding establishment and was unpopular with
farmers. Hartmann offers two reasons: first the permanency of the benefits of hybrid
vigor was questioned, and second, the principles and standards of the breeding industry
were based on purebreds rather than crossbreeds.  Some breeders of purebred chickens
refused to sell chicks to university professors suspected of engaging in crossbreeding
(Hanke).
This resistance on the part of poultry breeders left a void into which stepped the hybrid
corn companies, whose experience with corn breeding convinced them of the economic
value of hybrid vigor. Pioneer began a hybrid chick program in 1936 based on the
technique of inbreeding. 2 In 1942 the “Hy-line chick” was released. In 1944 DeKalb
began a poultry program, and four years later the “DeKalb Chix” came on the market.
The third major producer of hybrid chicks by the 1950s was Ames In-cross, a subsidiary
of Fosbilt feeds (Sauer).
Farmers were slow to accept the new chicks, but good results from hybrids in
performance tests eventually increased acceptance rates (Bugos). By 1956 egg
production of hybrid hens was 195 per year (Sauer). To boost sales, Hy-line sold its
chicks for half price in exchange for a promise from the farmer to keep careful records of
the chicks  productivity. This plan provided  the vaIuable word of mouth publicity, as well
as production data, that was necessary. to convince a skeptical audience. These methods
paid off. “By the 1954, the Hy-line Chick had captured a 20 percent share of the very
decentralized American market for layers” (Bugos, p. 142).Crossbreeds rapidly
captured the market for broilers. By 1943,  97 percent of commercial broilers were
same breed or line.Hybrid vigor, or heterosis, is a phenomenon that occurs when the offspnng of a cross
are larger and more vigorous than the parents (Lasley, 1978)
21nbreeding  is the crossing of related parents, such as a father and a daughter.crossbred. However it must be remembered that the broiler market was considerably
smaller than the layer market at this time.
The techniques used by the corn companieswere successful in proving the productive
potential of crossbreeds. However the single cross, inbreeding process they used was
costly and unpredictable, and dependence on inbred lines was a major weakness of the
system. Though it is no longer used commercially, Hartmann concludes that “the
introduction of the hybrid chickens produced by applying the system of corn breeding
provided the necessary stimulus for many established breeders to undertake crossbreeding
activities which resulted in similarly. successful hybrid stocks and paved the way for the
structure of the modem poultry breeding industry ” (P. 14).
Before 1950, the market for layers was much more important than the market for broilers.
In 1940, the ratio of broilers to layers vvas 1 to 3; by 1950, it was 6 to 1 (Hartmann).
Dunng that period, a variety of forces came together to make possible a dramatic increase
in scale of production.New mechanical technologies for large-scale production,
processing,  transportation and storage increased the siz.e of production units and the
market. Advances in nutrition. disease control and breeding--including a reliable
method  for sexing chicks that allowed meat and egg production to be separated--also
contributed to the increase in SIZE and the specialization into meat or egg production.
In addition, new institutional arrangements in production and marketing attracted new
participants with new attitudes about poultry production (Reimund). The new broiler
producers, who generally came from outside of poultry, used the available new
technologies and operated on a much larger scale than existing poultry producers.
Integrators, initially feed manufacturers looking to increase demand for their products,
provided financial support and insurance to producers. The arrangements eventually.I
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became formalized in the production contacts that characterize today’s highly integrated
poultry production and processing industry.
Competition was increasing along with scale in the industry. Throughout the 196Os,
overproduction and prices below cost were an almost constant problem. Growth in
output exceeded growth in demand, despite falling prices (Bishop and Christensen).
There was a frequent turnover among firms in the industry, with surviving firms buying
up failing competitors (Bugos). Broiler production became more and more concentrated
both geographically in the southeast --Georgia, Alabama and Arkansas--and in terms of
market structure. In 1961, six companies accounted for 20 percent of production
(Western). By 1988, the top four companies--Tyson, Conagra, Goldkist and Perdue,
accounted for 43 percent (Bugos).
Chicks were only 3 percent of the cost of a live broiler by the 197Os, but they played a
crucial role in the production process (Bugos). Uniformity in terms of growth rates and
characterstics was essential to the continuous operation of highly-mechanized, automated
processring lines. Given the demands of both their technology and their markets, the
processors were able to specify exactly what kind of bird they wanted. They didn’t wait
for the Industry to provide it.In 1946, the A&P Company decided to jump start the
search for the perfect bird by sponsoning the “Chickcn of Tomorrow,” contest.
Three years later Charles Vantress  of Live Oak, California was named the winner,
recerving “$5000 and invaluable publicity”for his cross of a Comish rooster and a New
Hampshire hen, two birds known for their size and muscling qualities (ibid). The runner
up in the first contest was the son of the owner of a Glastonbury Connecticut farm called
Arbor Acres. On the strength of its performance in the contest, Arbor Acres captured 25
percent of the female breeding market while Vantress, who also won the second contest9
in 1951, held one third of the market for males (Bugos, Hanke). The winners of these
contests took over the market. The only new breeding companies to enter since that time
have been spin-offs from the winners (Bugos).By 1985, Arbor Acres accounted for 60
percent of the female broiler breeding stock. By 1989,  90 percent of the market for parent
chicks was controlled by three female lines and three males lines (ibid).
Such extreme concentration in both the breeding and the production/processing industries
has led to establishment of close, even subsidiary, relationships between producer/
processors and breeding companies. In 1986, Tysons bought half ownership of Cobb-
Vantress  to secure unrestricted access to its chicks (ibid). This renders the concept of
diffusion at the production level somewhat moot. Producers are linked, directly or
indirectly, to the breeding companies that generate new technologies.
B. Swine
Unlike the U.S. poultry industry, where there is essentially one production structure and
one type of breeding technology, the U.S. swine industry is currently characterized by
several competing production structures and approaches to breeding. However
significant structural changes are occurring in hog production, and it remains to be seen
whether it will follow the pattern of poultry or continue to support a variety of seedstock
suppliers.
There are essentially three main sources of breeding stock in the U.S swine industry: a
farmer’s own herd, purebred breeders and breeding companies. This paper focuses on
the latter two since they are sources of improved stock. Purebred breeders, as their name
implies, sell purebred animals. They are generally small producers who serve local or
regional markets. Swine breeding companies, on the other hand, are similar to poultry10
breeding companies in that they are large, international corporations. The breeding
companies produce hybrid pigs.
In 1989, the most recent year for which estimates are available, the breeding companies
sold 38 percent of commercial boars and 14 percent of gilts in the U.S. Purebred breeders
accounted for 58 percent of boars and 10 percent of gilts (McLaren, p. 40). The market
share of the breeding companies has likely increased since these data were collected.
Since 1990, there has been a dramatic increase in the number of breeding companies
operating in the U.S.Established companies such as Pig Improvement Company (PIC),
Farmer’s Hybrid and DeKalb have been joined in recent years by affiliates of European
breeding companies such as Seghershybrid, Newsham Hybrids, National Pig
Development Co., and Danbred USA. Many of the European companies operate in the
U.S. through joint ventures or marketing agreements with American breeders or
producers (Marbey).
The source of seedstock is related to the type of breeding system a producer is using, and
the type of breeding system is closely linked  to the structure of production. There are two
main breeding systems through which  producers introduce improved genetics into their
herds. In rotational crossbreeding programs, farmers purchase purebred boars from
breeders and mate them with crossbred sows. This system became popular after
experiment station studies  in the 1930s and 1940s showed the potential for hybrid vigor
in swine (Craft; Whatley et al, 1953). It is popular with farmers because it permits some
benefit from hybrid vigor while at the same time letting them retain sows from their own
herds as replacement breeding stock.However, the retention of sows for breeding means
that the maternal and paternal lines are not unrelated. The closer the relation between a
boar and a gilt, the less potential for heterosis. This reduces the potential for productivitygain because it prevents separate selection for reproductive characteristics and carcass
characteristics.
The second way of incorporating improved genetics is terminal cross reeding. This
program was developed in the late 1950s in Europe, where producers face high land and
feed costs (Marbery). Terminal crossbreeding maximizes output per animal, “crossing
distinct maternal and paternal lines to produce the end product” (ibid, p. 18 ). All
offspring from the final cross are marketed, which means that replacement stock cannot
be retained from the herd.The advantage of terminal cross breeding is that maternal
lines can be chosen on the basis of reproductive efficiency and paternal lines on leanness,
rate of weight gain and other carcass characteristics. Maximum heterosis is achieved for
sows and pigs. While terminal crossbreeding requires more management time, it also
results in a faster rate of genetic improvement, meaning higher productivity. Estimates of
the benefits of terminal cross breeding range from $4.73 to $13.90 per pig (Lazarus,
1991).
Rotational crossbreeding is associated with home-raised gilts and purchased purebred or
crossbred boars. In terminal crossbreeding, breeding animals, especially boars, are
purchased from breeding companies. In the U.S., the relatively small percent of boars
and gilts that come from breeding companies reflects the dominance of rotational
crossbreeding. By contrast, in Europe, nearly, 100 percent of boars and 70 percent of gilts
come from breeding companies (McLaren).
This suggests a reluctance on the part of U.S. producers to adopt the new breeding
technology. “While US producers began replacing labor with capital with the advent of
confinement in the 1970s basic breeding systems were little changed from the 1950s.
While experimenting boldly with technology--slatted floors, crates, climate control--12
producers were reluctant to switch away from their reliance of rotational crossbreeding
systems and fascination with breed “type” shows as the basis for their selection decisions”
(Marbery, p. 18).According to Gerald Shurson of the University of Minnesota, “if you
look at reproductive efficiency and growth efficiency, we in the United States haven’t
been forced to achieve the performance that producers in other parts of the world have.
Consequently we have been satisfied with average genetics” (Freeze, 1993, p. 35).
However, national averages do not represent a uniform pattern of technology diffusion.
Very large farms are much more likely to obtain seedstock from breeding companies than
are smaller producers. Technical and structural changes currently occurring in the hog
industry are increasing the number, size and market share of the large farms. Between
1979- 1987 the break-even point doubled to 1000 hogs per year (Rhodes and Grimes).
Current minimum average cost has been estimated to be between 5000 and 16,000 head
annually. Behind these statistics is an even more dramatic change--the emergence during
the 1980s of the so-called mega-farms. These are producers who sell more than 50,000
hogs per year. These super-producers were only . 1% of hog farmers in 1991, but they
accounted for almost 13% of total production (Rhodes and Grimes). They are also the
fastest growing segment of the industry (Lazarus and Buhr). Predictions are that within
10 years, corporations wil1 control between a third and a majority of the nation’s hogs
(Kilman,  1994.a).
Their size, specialization and emphasis on management allow the large operations to
devote considerable attention to breeding and genetics. Terminal crossbreeding, artificial
insemination, a high level of mechanization, and attention to cleanliness and disease
control give the large farms a cost advantage.“Some experts suggest than a mega-farm
can easily make a hog for 10% less than the typical family farm” (Kilman, 1994a, p. A5).13
The reasons why the largest producers are customers of the breeding companies are not
undisputed. The companies promote their superior genetics, which are based on
extensive genetic research and testing and supported by large quantities of performance
data. While acknowledging the importance of genetic testing and data, some experts
contend that the productivity of the hybrid pigs is not necessarily higher than that of the
purebreds (Fee and Freeze).
One clear advantage of the breeding companies is that they can offer volume and
uniformity that the large customers demand (Gunset). The increasing size of production
units and the rise of horizontal integration at the production level mean that the number of
animals managed by a single person has increased dramatically (Rhodes). Further, some
of the mega farms are characterized by close integration with processors. Processors
want to control their supply--in terms of quantity and quality--and close linkages with
large producers allow them to do it economically.Pork quality, especially increased
leanness, is an important issue at the retail level and this is being transmitted backwards
to the breeding level.
Some breeding companies sell to both small and large producers, while other focus
exclusively on the larger farm market. Several breeding companies target the large farm
market by promoting their products through the makers of, for example, large
confinement houses (Marbery). In other cases, a producer/processor might contract
directly with a breeding company to guarantee exclusive tights to its genetics (Marbery;
Gillespie and Eidman). In a market characterized by supply relationships of this sort, the
small producers and the small breeders are at a disadvantage.
Purebred breeders market their product very differently from the corporate suppliers. As
noted earlier, purebred breeders are predominantly private, family farmers who specialize14
in the production of breeding stock. They advertise mainly in local newspapers and breed
magazines. Rather than promote their individual operation, producers often promote the
superiority of the breed (Hayenga et al, 1981). Rhodes points out that with only three
specialized national hog magazines left, mass communication is unlikely to continue to
be an effective means of product promotion for any input supplier.Some experts suggest
that purebred breeders could compete better with the breeding companies for the large
farm market if they organized themselves to provide the same services, in terms of
volume and performance testing, that the companies do (Fee and Freese). Many
progressive purebred breeders have begun to do so (Shurson, 1995).
Until recently, artificial insemination (AI) had not been widely used in hog production in
the U.S. The AI technology in swine is not as well developed as in other livestock
sectors. Frozen boar semen isn’t as effective as fresh semen, and conception rates using
AI are lower than with natural service (Freese, 1994).Therefore AI providers must rely
on fresh semen, which limits the market size.
Improvements in technology and distribution are causing this to change. AI use is
currently increasing among swine producers, and both purebred breeders and breeding
companies are operating AI studs (Lazarus, 1995; Shurson).One of the main benefits of
AI IS that it reduces the number of boars required  to sevice a herd, which in turn
increases the number of sows a producer can maintain. Other benefits include increased
flexibility in choice of genetics, less disease risk, and consistent breeding performance
year round (Freese, 1994). AI is often considered a scale-neutral innovation, however the
fact that fresh semen must be used could lead to adoption by larger farmers.15
C. Dairy
The dairy industry is generally considered to be receptive to new technologies
(Joumeaux). Dairy was the first livestock sector to embrace the concept of improved
breeding for commercial production. The first local herd improvement association was
founded in Michigan in 1905 (Herman). When artificial insemination became available
in the late 1930s breed and herd improvement associations within the dairy industry
responded positively to the efforts of the extension service to promote its use.Table 2
shows the increase in cows bred by AI during the first few years it was available. By the
1970s average adoption rates in the U.S. were approaching 65 percent, where they are
today (Hogeland, Hanke). However between regions the use rates vary from 50 and 80
percent (Hanke, US Congress).




Bulls Cows Bulls Cows
1930 1079 35,333 33 7,539




1942 43,251 412 112,788
1942 1230 41,487 574 182,524
a Prior to AI, farmers belonged to bull associations, through which they jointly owned
bulls.
Source: Agricultural Research Admmistration, USDA, January 1944 from Herman, 1981.
Several reasons are given for the relatively early and rapid adoption of AI technology by
the dairy industry (Joumeaus, Herman). First, once AI was shown to be as effective as
natural service, the extension service made a special effort to promote it. AI was
introduced at the local level through cooperatives formed by producers, breeders and
researchers and extension personnel.
The first producer-owned AI breeding cooperative in the United States began operating in
New Jersey in 1938. A local extension agent convinced 102 dairy farmers in New Jersey
to form a cooperative organized along the lines of the coops he had seen on a recent visit16
to Denmark. The organization began with just over 1000 cows. Several months later a
similar association was established in Hughesville, Missouri, including dairy farmers, the
Missouri College of Agriculture and the Farm Security Administration. By 1946 there
were 84 Al production facilities (bull studs) recorded by the USDA’s Dairy Herd
Improvement Letter. At the county level there were over 600 artificial breeding
associations in 34 states (Herman, 1981).Initially, AI cooperatives offered custom
service, where technicians came out to the farm to perform inseminations. Some also
offered classes to educate farmers (Herman).
The role of the regional cooperatives was instrumental in the development of the AI
industry (Herman).When AI was introduced in 1939, the market was not sophisticated
enough for many private companies. AI organizations needed not only to perfect the
techniques, but also to persuade skeptical producers that the product actually worked.
Coops and other early associations, working closely with agriculture extension workers
and university scientists, performed this role. They essentially created a functioning
market into which other organizations later entered. During the 1950s after frozen semen
became available, there was a period of rapid consolidation among the AI organizations.
Today the market is supplied by 20 cooperatives and serveral large private firms
(Hogeland). Despite their international marketing abilities, the cooperatives continue to
have a regional, membership oriented focus that reflects their origins (Hogeland).
A second important factor in the rapid diffusion of AI was its compatibility with the
existing production structure.Keeping bulls is a nuisance and a danger so farmers were
eager to get rid of them  AI did not require a large capital investment or a major
reorganization of the production process. The frequency with which dairy farmers see
their animals facilitates heat detection and animal monitoring.17
Third, in terms of industry characteristics, Joumeaux points out that dairy farms are
usually located near each other and are relatively homogenous in terms of production
processes and technology. These factors positively affect the spread of new technologies.
He also suggests that the price supports in place in the dairy industry contribute to higher
and more stable incomes for dairy farmers, which could also be expected to increase their
willingness to adopt new technologies.
As with the other livestock sectors, dairy is also experiencing structural changes. The
combination of increased production, slow growth in consumption and lower support
prices during in 1980s put pressure on the high cost dairies (US Congress). In general,
larger farms have lower production costs, and as a result production began to shift from
the traditional dairy areas like the Northeast and the Midwest to the Pacific, Mountain
and Southern plains regions (ibid).Average herd sizes were 50-150 cows in the
Northeast and Midwest, and 500-1500  in the Southern and Western states.
The large dairies are more likely to adopt new technologies. In the traditional dairy
states just over half of the cows are bred by AI. In the non-traditional, fast-growing
dairy states like California and New  Mexico, the use rates are much higher (Hanke, US
Congress). This willingness to innovate   is reflected in the higher production levels
attained by producers in these regions.  Table 3 shows average production per cow for the
different regions.18









Source: U.S. Congress, 1991, p. 19
According to Shumway, in 1987 current production levels could have been 33-45 percent
higher had AI been fully exploited. One explanation for the difference in adoption rates
and productivity between regions and producers is that there are costs involved with
using AI effectively. The quality of farmers’ breeding decisions is the key factor in
increasing productivity through AI. Sound breeding decisions can make AI a profitable
investment, but poorly informed choices can be costly (Shumway). Farmers decide how
much time to invest acquiring knowledge about breeding and genetics based on their
expected return.Factors such as unit size appear to increase expected return.
More and more farmers are investing in computers to help them access and analyze the
large quantities of performance data that are available (Bosch and Lee). However despite
the urging of researchers and industry groups to base selection decisions on the numbers,
many farmers are unwillmg to give up selection on the basis of type, on the appearance of
the bull. On the basis of several recent surveys, Hogeland reports that farmers are aware
of the importance of performance data, however information such as pedigrees and
photographs do infIuence  their choices (Hogeland). She concludes that many producers
“lack an adequate understanding of sire summaries” and therefore do not use them as the
sole source of information for breeding decisions (p. 7).19
According to the Office of Technology Assessment, successful dairies are distinguished
by “progressiveness, philosophy, and quality of management. These factors directy
impact technology adoption and the size of dairy farms” (US Congress, 1991, p. 7). If the
rate of adoption of AI can be considered as a measure of willingness to adopt new
technology, this suggests that the larger dairies will also be most likely to adopt other
new technologies such as Bst or superovulation, thereby increasing their productivity
advantage over small, more traditional dairies.
D. Beef Cattle
Unlike dairy, the beef cattle industry is reputed to be slow to adopt new technology.
Improved breeding technologies appear to be no exception. The beef improvement
programs in the U.S. are only half as old as the dairy program, reflecting a much later
interest in genetic improvement (Baker). About 15-20 percent of beef cattle in the U.S.
are born through artificial insemination (Keeton). A Canadian study estimated that while
95 percent of Ontario dairy producers use AI, only 5-10 percent of beef producers do
(Cranfield and Houfard). The apparent resistance to new technologies has led several
authors to take a closer look at the adoption of breeding technology by beef producers. In
many cases, they concluded that there are often  good economic reasons why beef
producers have not adopted new technologies  (Joumeaus, Cranfield and Howard;
Cartwright; Cunha et al).  Institutional, structural and informational characteristics of the
beef industry appear to reduce the profitability of breeding technologies in beef.
As with the other livestock sectors, breeding purebred beef cattle was popular in the U.S.
by the mid 19th century.By the turn of the century, U.S. breed associations existed for
all the major British breeds. At that time, a breeder’s goal was to win at regional and
national stock shows. The characteristics that were rewarded in these shows were very
different from those that were important in commercial production. Over time the20
standards of these two sides of the beef industry have come closer together. However the
showring  continues to be a profitable goal , and there continue to be two distinct factions
within the beef industry, one focusing on purebreds for show and the other on crossbreeds
for commercial production. Use of new breeding technologies such as AI is still much
more prevalent among the former group than the latter (Cranfield and Howard).
Competition from the commercial producers eventually caused the breeding
establishment to accept and promote performance testing and selection for economic
characteristics. By mid-century commercial cattle were more profitable, yet commercial
producers benefited little from the efforts of the established breeders (Willham, 1982).
Eighty percent of U.S. beef came from feedlots  in the south and southwest and from
crossbred cattle (ibid). What breeding improvements occurred in these areas came in the
form of new breeds--Santa Gertrudis, Beefmaster--that were developed by Southern
ranchers, in cooperation with experimentation stations, to withstand the harsh climate
(Cunha et al).
The arrival of the large, fast-growing Charolais from Mexico in the 1930s was the
impetus  for breeders to begin emphasizing characteristics like size and rate of weight
gain. In the 1940s and 195Os, interest in performance testing grew among researchers at
state and regional testing stations and, later, among the breed associations (Willham,
1985). During the 1960s and 1970s the efforts of the Beef Improvement Federation to
increase the demand for performance information coincided with the arrival in the U.S. of
the so-called “exotic” breeds -- Simmental, Limousin, Maine-Anjou and other continental
European breeds. Like the Charolais, these breeds had size and growth characteristics that
were in demand among commercial producers.21
Several changes resulted from the arrival of the exotics and the growing profitability of
commercial production. First, the arrival of the exotics indirectly stimulated the use of AI
in beef cattle (ibid). Customs restrictions prevented animals from being imported directly
into the U.S., which meant that semen was available only through AI from bulls on
Canadian quarantine stations. Prior to this time, AI was rarely used in the U.S. beef
industry. When AI first became practical in the 193Os, it had been bitterly opposed by
the established breed associations. They attempted to limit its use through restrictions
such as requiring that both sire and dam of a registered animal be owned by the same
person. Their resistance is understandable since the value of a champion bull is due to his
exclusivity. AI would dramatically reduce the number of bulls demanded, which would
reduce the economic value of many current breeding animals. A lawsuit during the 1960s
against the American Angus Association finally stopped the breed associations from
actively obstructing the AI industry.
The exotics also spurred the development of national sire evaluation programs.
Producers were very interested in the new breeds, but had no data upon which to base
their breeding decisions. Performance evaluations of these new breeds were eagerly
awaited from the US Meat Animal Research Center (Willham, 1982). In 1971, the
American Simmental Association released the first sire summary. The British breed
associations,  recognizing that performance programs would become their major reason
for being, were quick to follow (Ibid). They developed programs, based on the theory and
esample of dairy improvement programs, to measure productivity across herds and
increase the accuracy and intensity of selection predictors (Middleton and Gibb, 1991).
Finally, the availability of the exotic breeds increased the demand for cross breeding
among commercial producers. Originally very unpopular among breeders, crossbreeding
has become an accepted and important part of commercial beef production. Tests showed22
that output per cow can increase as much as 25 percent per cow as a result of hybrid vigor
(Herman, 1981). This hybrid vigor can be maintained through properly planned crosses,
however management time increases (ibid). By 1984, approximately 50 percent of
commercial producers used some crossbreeding (Willham, 1984).
Despite the efforts of researchers and industry federation officials, the level of adoption
of AI and the use of available performance data by producers in selection decisions is
low. Joumeaux looked specifically at failure to adopt new technologies among sheep and
beef cattle producers.His paper focuses on New Zealand, but many of his arguments
apply in the US as well. He begins with the assumption, which has been confirmed in an
empirical study by Cranfield and Howard, that there are no significant demographic
characteristics that distinguish beef producers from dairy producers, who adopted AI
more readily. Joumeaux attributed the slower rate of adoption to three factors: structure,
institutions and extension activities.
In terms of production structure Joumeaus suggests that there are differences between
dairy and beef cattle farms that favor adoption of technology by dairy producers. There is
a wide variety of production systems used by beef producers compared to the more
homogenous dairy production system (Joumeaus, Cartwright). Further, beef cattle
ranches are often located very far from each other, and the climatic conditions can vary
widely between them. In addition, heat detection  IS difficult for ranchers whose animals
range over large areas.
Cartwright argues that most breeding  research is narrowly focused on a few
characteristics. In dairy, milk production may be an appropriate variable on which to
focus attention, but in cattle many factors are important in measuring overall herd
performance. He promotes a more systems-oriented approach to breeding, suggestingthat, instead of a particular physical characteristic, income or return on investment should
be the dependent variable of interest to researchers (Cartwright, Hohenboken).
In terms of institutional factors, Joumeaux contrasts the “cooperative” oriented nature of
the dairy industry to the more individualistic nature of beef production.He suggests that
there is more to this than simply the traditional stereotypes of cattle ranchers as “rugged
individualists.”Dairy herd improvement programs, processing and even communication
channels are often cooperative efforts, while their counterparts in the beef industry, if
they exist, are not. The dairy industry is more involved in improvement programs and in
research and development. There is no unified beef improvement program in the U.S.
Beef genetic improvement efforts are very fragmented compared to other livestock
sectors within the U.S. or to other national beef improvement programs such as in
Canada, Australia, or Japan (Middleton and Gibb, 1991). Joumeaux concludes that
communication channels are more “open and effective” within dairy as compared to beef.
The nature of the beef industry would be expected to inhibit technology adoption.
Third, Joumeaux identifies the greater focus of extension activities on dairy farmers as an
important factor in dairy farmers’ greater willingness to adopt new technologies.The
ratio of agents to farmers is higher in dairy, which he hypothesized should lead to greater
adoption. Other evidence, however, suggests that the causation is more complex.
Findings of Cranfield and Howard, who studied the AI use of Ontario beef producers,
indicate that non-users had significantly more contact with extension agents and spent
more time at farm and community organizations. Non-users also had higher incomes,
used cross breeding and had a more commercial orientation that AI users . AI users
tended to be purebred breeders with smaller operations who list farming as a secondary
occupation. These results are consistent with a picture of AI users as people whose24
primary interest in animal breeding is for personal satisfaction rather than economic gain.
(Cranfield and Howard).
Middleton and Gibb argue that the structural transformation currently occurring in the
beef industry is more severe than in any other segment of the livestock industry. During
the 1980s it appears that there was a structural change in consumer demand for beef.
Despite declining real prices, per capita consumption of beef declined from a high of 91.4
lbs in 1977 to 69 lbs in 1989 (Purcell). This change in demand has had a major impact on
the processing industry, which experienced extremely rapid concentration during the
1980s. In 1994, sixty-nine percent of beef processing was done by four companies (Bixby
et al). What the effect of this concentration in processing will be on production is unclear.
It is linked to concentration among producers and breeders in swine and poultry. There is
evidence that larger beef producers were the only ones able to make a profit during the
1970s and 1980s (Purcell).
Genetic  improvement programs will be important to stabilizing the beef industry and
regaining  lost consumer demand. According to Middleton and Gibb (p. 3864)
“A recent change in the orientation of meat packers towards consumer desires is
causing a change in the way slaughter cattle are priced and purchased. Packers
expect fed cattle that meet their specifications; feeders expect cattle that meet both
their specifications, and the packer’s cow/calf producers expect seedstock genetics
that meet the specification of all segments. And, at each stage, there is a growing
expectation of documentation. Again, new traits must be measured to satisfy the
requirements of each segment, and delivery systems are needed that can provide
understandable genetic documentation.”
The standards of processors are having a powerful impact on breeding goals. Pressure
from the supply side could increase the diffusion of breeding technology within the beef
industry.25
IV. Observations on Diffusion of Technology and Industry Structure in the
Livestock Sector
In several respects, the above sectoral  case studies reinforce the general conclusions of
previous diffusion studies (Rogers). First, in terms of the communication of an
innovation, previous studies suggest that the awareness of innovation comes from outside
the existing system and through mass media communication, while the actual adoption of
an innovation is more closely associated with interpersonal communication and local
information networks (Rogers). The diffusion of livestock breeding technologies
provides some support for this hypothesis. In most sectors, the traditional breeding
establishments initially resisted the introduction of the new technologies. Relative
outsiders, such as the corn breeding companies in poultry or the European breeding
companies in pork, introduced the new technologies commercially in the U.S.. While
these early promoters didn’t always enjoy widespread adoption of the technologies, they
were nonetheless instrumental in getting the traditional establishment to take notice. In
dairy, the only sector to experience rapid initial diffusion, the innovation of AI was
introduced at the local level and great care was taken to incorporate the farmer into the
innovation process . The formation of cooperatives and the provision of education and
technical support appear to have increased the rate with which farmers accepted the new
technology.
Regarding the specific charactenstics of an innovation, evidence from livestock is also
generally consistent with what diffusion theory would  predict. Compatibility of an
innovation with the existing beliefs and systems of production does seem to be, ceteris
paribus, positively associated with a higher rate of diffusion. Technologies which did not
require high fixed costs or major changes in the type or sequence of tasks were initially
more readily accepted than those that did require these adjustments. Dairy is the best
example of compatibility, while beef provides an example of incompatibility.There also26
seems to be a relationship between the ability to monitor and measure the impact of a
technology and its rate of adoption. Daily milking facilitates monitoring of productivity
in the dairy industry, as do confinement systems in poultry and pork.
In terms of production structure, there is some evidence that, ceteris paribus,
homogeneity of producers is positively associated with technology adoption. Once
again, dairy and beef provide support for the generalizations.
While these conclusions do provide some explanation for the differing patterns of
diffusion of breeding technologies among the four sectors in the short run , they are
unsatisfying in that they do not account for the fact that a sector like poultry, which
initially did not fit the profile of a rapidly-adopting industry, currently has the highest
level of diffusion. Further, they give little insight into the reasons for the radical
structural changes that have accompanied technological change in some livestock sectors.
The foIlowing observations about the relationship between technological and structural
change suggest a need to view diffusion of technology as part of an ongoing process of
change that both affects and is affected by the structure of the production system.
First, the breeding technologies reviewed here--namely AI and hybrid animals--appear to
be associated with economies of size in terms of the management input. The real cost of
adoption decreases with the effective size of the production unit. This contributes to the
increase in unit size and/or horizontal integration at the production level that is now
prevalent throughout the industry. AI is often considered to be scale neutral, however
increasing the size and specialization of an operation appears to allow more profitable
exploitation of the technology. AI is an innovation which has both a hardware and a
software component (Rogers). It may be scale neutral in the hardware component, but in27
terms of the software--the information and human capital component--there appear to be
economies of size.
As information technology and genetic knowledge improve, the potential benefits of
adopting improved technology become even larger. Continued adoption of breeding
technologies by producers will continue to put upward pressure on farm size. There is no
evidence that we are at the frontier in terms of unit size, at least from the perspective of
management of breeding information.
Second, there appears to be a clear relationship between adoption of technologies and
vertical integration in livestock. Breeding technologies have contributed to integration
through their complementary technical relationships with other inputs such as improved
feeds, medicines or building systems, and with processing systems. This
complementarity means that other sectors that are horizontally or vertically linked to the
producers are directly affected by the producers’ adoption decisions. Firms in these
related sectors and stages of production have an incentive to become involved in
decisions about technology adoption in the production stage.
The major way that this has occurred in livestock is through financing of production. The
fixed costs of adopting a package of technologies are high. In the absence of integration,
the risk of adopting falls on the producers, while other sectors stand to benefit.
Independently, producers may not be willing or able to obtain credit for these
investments. In poultry and pork, the production contract solves this problem by shifting
some of the risk from producers to feed manufacturers, processors or others who would
benefit from the adoption of the technology. Integration appears to be a response to the
fact that externalities in technology adoption cause markets--especially for credit and
insurance--to fail.28
The form that integration takes depends on the specific situation. In the case of broilers,
the current structure is highly vertically integrated with feed manufacturers and
processors playing the integrator role. In pork, established producers have taken a more
prominent role in defining the horizontal and vertical relationships within the industry.
This follows the pattern of the Danish hog industry, often considered to be “the world’s
most advanced system of production” (McLaren, p. 40), where “the producers own the
slaughter houses and packers collect a production levy to finance performance testing and
data processing, advisory and administrative expenses” (ibid, pp. 40-41).  Compared to
the U.S. hog industry, the Danish hog industry has very high levels of technology
adoption, including breeding technologies such as hybrid pigs and AI. This is consistent
with the hypothesis that adoption is related to degree of integration.
Third, there appears to be a link between vertical integration in an industry and its
responsiveness to changing consumer demand. The poultry and the mega-farm sector of
pork are examples of industries which have benefited from their ability to provide
products with specific characteristics demanded by consumers. Increased leanness and
uniformity of the carcass have contributed to higher quality and lower prices for final
products in these sectors. In both cases, breeding  technologies have played an important
role in facilitating the responsivencss to demand at the retail level. This suggests that
where the scope for genetic change is great, the diffusion of breeding technologies is
higher. As discussed above, higher adoption rates are related to more vertical integration.
The importance of demand side factors is likely to increase in the future. The extent to
which producer prices reward producers who focus on characteristics valued by
consumers varies among the industries. However this is changing, and producer prices
are expected to reflect more closely consumer desires in all sectors of the livestock29
industry. Past experience would suggest that such a change would be accompanied by
increased vertical integration. The dairy industry presents an interesting case in this
regard. Genetic manipulation may soon make it possible for milk to be produced with
specific characteristics, such as low lactose levels, that are popular with consumers (US
Congress). This could have implications for the structure of the dairy industry.
V. Conclusion
Using a traditional approach to innovation diffusion fails to capture many of the
important factors affecting the choice of breeding technology in U.S. livestock sectors.
While the traditional approach offers some explanation for the differing diffusion patterns
among sectors, many important questions about the longer-term relationships between
technology adoption and industry structure remain unanswered in such a framework.
Technology adoption in U.S. livestock is clearly related to increasing size and decreasing
number of firms. It is also related to increasing integration among those that remain. As
the number of decision-makers declines, and as different stages of production become
more closely integrated, the process of technology diffusion will likely be very different
from the pattern observed in a competitive and decentralized market. The impact of
market integration on the generation and diffusion of technology is an important areas for
further research. A complete model of technology diffusion must allow for interactions
between agents, technology and industry structure that result from the introduction of an
innovation (Ruttan).Such a model would be necessary to accurately describe the
process of technical and structural evolution in the U.S. livestock sector.30
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